I / Bloody Mary
The word “Espionage”, along with all things associated with it, brings to mind “cloaks and daggers” accompanied by “shadowy figures”. Danger, drama and intrigue closely follow to set a stage wherein “perception” becomes the reality.
The Naval Investigative Service (N.I.S.) maintains jurisdiction and responsibility for the investigation of all felony crimes committed aboard Naval and Marine Corp Installations worldwide. In addition the organization also shoulders responsibilities for “counterintelligence” for the Department of Navy. At its core N.I.S. supports the Department of the Navy in all matters requiring criminal investigative or counterintelligence support.
Through the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s the Philippines was an integral part of the strategic planning for U.S. interests in S.E. Asia. Port facilities, ship repair capabilities, along with well established air facilities such as Cubi Point Air Station and Clark Airforce Base, were high capacity hubs for the U.S. Military. As a result N.I.S. ‘s support mission to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corp mandated three separate Offices, Manila, Cubi Point Airbase, and Subic Bay. The Subic NIS Office was by far the largest with Cubi Point running second. The Naval Communications Center was physically located at Cubi Point and as such if N.I.S. assistance was needed; it would be covered by Agents assigned to Cubi.
What started as a “call of concern” arrived on the Duty Agent’s desk at Cubi. Basic information collected indicated “concern” regarding a civilian employee of the Com Center paying “too much” attention to various classified messages being processed. Initial investigative formalities disclosed that the Civilian employee was in fact a retired U.S. Navy Senior Chief who had resided in the Philippines for several years. Once fully identified it was determined that the Civilian employee was in fact a registered N.I.S. Cooperating Witness (CW) who had been recruited by Agent personnel at Subic. The CW was none other than Mike Allen who had recently provided critical criminal intelligence resulting in the transport of firearms and ammunition to the Japanese Yokuza in Atsugi, Japan.
Within a short period of time N.I.S. technical support from Washington, D.C. visited Cubi Point’s Communication center and installed covert camera coverage so that Allen’s activities could be monitored. Initial confirmation disclosed that Allen was in fact expending excessive amounts of time reading various classified messages. Additionally, the camera coverage confirmed that Allen was in fact copying various classified messages and concealing them on his person when he left the Communications Center.
Surveillance of Allen leaving the parking area adjacent to the Comm. Center disclosed that he usually drove to the back gate entrance of Subic and then proceeded directly to his residence. Pinpointing specific message topics being scrutinized by Allen was difficult. Eventually it was determined the traffic he was most interested in was intelligence reports written primarily by N.I.S. personnel. Report topics centered on intelligence related to activities of the “New People’s Army” (NPA) cincerning local Philippine Government officials that were potentially being targeted for assasination or other related action.
In addition to the N.I.S. reports centering on NPA activities, concern was also present that Allen had access to other sensitive intelligence reports generated by the U.S. Navy P-3 Squadron. The P-3’s maintained constant surveillance flights within the S.E. Asia region and as a result created a huge volume of intelligence reports relating to their photographic and electronic intercept efforts.
Over a relatively short period of time Allen had become comfortable enough with his relationship with me that he increasingly disclosed various illegal activities he was involved in. Possession of a firearm by an American within the Philippines was a definite taboo. Exceptions obviously included certain American Officials who were authorized in their official capacity however, a “private American citizen” was without a doubt “out of bounds” carrying or possessing a firearm. Allen had previously demonstrated that “the rules” about firearms possession did not apply to him and now he seemed to be on a quest to display that “rules and regulations” in general were to “be ignored”.
Allen’s behavior on a particular Saturday afternoon stood as a stark reality jolt for me personally but resultantly for N.I.S. Hq. also. While cooking a few T Bones over his home grill Allen asks “can I see your credentials”? Not wanting to appear alarmed and knowing he had seen N.I.S. credentials previously, I showed him my N.I.S. credentials. The credentials consisted of one photo I.D. card enclosed in a leather case and a shield inscribed with “Special Agent” and “Naval Investigative Service”. Within a short time Allen pulls a leather I.D. holder from his pocket and hands it to me saying “see what you think”.
Upon opening the leather wallet I immediately see an I.D. card bearing Allen’s picture and a caption saying “Representative, Naval Investigation Service”. Adjacent to the photo I.D. is a gold shield displaying “Representative” and “Naval Investigation Service”. Being a bit lost for words I say “Mike, that is really cool” and follow up by asking “who made them for you”. “Had them made by a friend in town” was his reply. My mind was quietly asking “is your friend Russian”? Before I utter anything Allen says “if you think that is something wait until you see this” as he reaches in a carry bag and pulls out several hundred blank U.S. Military I.D. cards. I take a huge sip of beer while thinking “what do I say now”. Response comes quickly “no s — t, same guy?” and Allen responds ``no, a friend of his”.
While finishing my steak and beer alarm bells were rechocheting in my mind. A bit less than a week ago, Allen had surprised me with his “Mr. Colt 45 pistol” and an introduction to Mr. Wren, a Chinese National. Now he is proudly displaying his “N.I.S. fake “credentials and badge” while throwing a black market fortune in blank U.S. Military IDs into the mix. Wanting to maintain an appearance of “no big deal” I asked “you mind if I get another beer?” After finishing, I casually told Allen I needed to go because I was expecting a busy Monday. Driving back to Subic uncharastically caused my stress level to elevate. Recalling Allen’s N.I.S. credentials I thought “how appropriate” for the inevitable “not quite right” (NQR) signature of “made in the Philippines” was present. Allen’s “gold shield” set forth “Naval Investigation Service” when in fact the actual organizational name was “Naval Investigative Service”.
As predicted Monday arrived quickly and with it I/Bloody Mary’s operational tempo was now at full bore. Activities to include Allen’s disclosure of counterfeit N.I.S. credentials and his possession of several hundred blank U.S. Military I.D. cards were verbally related to N.I.S. Hq. While I was occupied with putting together the written details relating to the weekend’s activities and observations N.I.S. Hq. fired the “bow shot”. Formal charges implicating Allen in Espionage activities were finalized and arrangements were set to immediately transport Allen to San Diego, California after his arrest. Details of Allen’s actual apprehension were planned and solidified. Military legal experts had determined that Allen, who was still on Fleet Reserve Status, would be brought back to “active duty status” and prosecuted by Military Court Martial proceedings.
Other than finishing administrative responsibilities and preparing for my eventual court testimony my “drama world, I/Bloody Mary” was coming to a close. Since I would not be designated to personally be involved in Allen’s arrest a ”stand down and relaxed posture” started to set in. As I put myself in coast speed I only half listened to the actual “apprehension — take into custody plan”. Allowing Allen to leave the Communication Center was solid for Allen would most probably have “classified messages’’ in his possession. However, when the briefing Agent related that Allen would be allowed to enter his vehicle and drive to the Subic back gate before being stopped and arrested, I had a momentary “red flash”. Immediate venting was needed so not wanting to cause a scene I made a dash for Wayne Clookie’s office, my ASAC.
Entering without knocking I immediately closed the door and told my ASAC what the apprehension plan was. Before he could respond I added “you don’t ever allow a bad guy to get in a vehicle” if you can avoid it. Immediately, I followed with “I don’t know who the tactical genius, imbecile is that devised the plan” and then asked “do you?” Once Wayne calmly responded “it was me” I was thankfully able to say “and a hell of a good plan it is” as I left his office professionally embarrassed and determined to escape without repercussions.
Special Agent Wayne Clookie was without a doubt one of the most competent and experienced supervisors I have ever worked for. He did his time as an Agent and once he moved into management his knowledge and leadership ability was “top shelf”. My one consolation is that Wayne knew I was a “solid Agent” but also knew I would occasionally “fire a round down range” unnecessarily. “Forgive and forget” was his stand and it was much appreciated.
Allen’s apprehension in his vehicle, just outside the back gate of Subic, was instrumental in enabling the Prosecution authority to prove crucial elements of the crime of Espionage. A search of Allen and his vehicle resulted in the recovery of several Classified Messages which he had removed from the Cubi Communication Center.
Without ceremony and without saying “goodbye” to his family, Allen was loaded onto a U.S. Navy C-130 and transported to the San Diego Naval Base detention facility (Brigg).
On 14 August 1987, a court martial in San Diego found Allen guilty of 10 counts of espionage and sentenced him to eight years in prison. The six-officer panel also imposed a $10,000 fine on the former radioman. New York Times 12 Dec 1986, “Navy Employee Held in Espionage-Related Case”
Within one year (1987) Allen’s assistance as a N.I.S. CW resulted in two significant criminal operations. The first, (Cebu Specials) resulted in the delivery of a shipment of handguns accompanied by ammunition to members of the Japanese Yakuza in Atsugi, Japan. Prosecution efforts by Japanese authorities resulted in eight (8) members of the Japanese Yakuza Crime Syndicate receiving lengthy prison sentences.
The second, (China Gold) resulted in the seizure of twenty (20) kilograms of pure heroin with a street value of twenty (20) million dollars. In addition, the arrest and prosecution of five (5) Chinese Nationals in Manila, Philippines as well as San Diego, Ca.
