China Gold

Mike Allen had worked as an N.I.S Cooperating Witness (CW) under my direction and control for over a year. Without a doubt, he had proven that not only was he familiar with various notable criminal enterprises ongoing in the Philippines, but that he had also earned and maintained the trust of those involved.

An illegal shipment of firearms and ammunition to Japanese Yakuza members had already resulted in the apprehension and prosecution of eight high level members of the Yakuza crime family in Atsugi Japan. Unquestionably, Allen had not only been the “source” of the initial information relating to the Yakuza activities he had personally arranged for the introduction of an “undercover person” to affect the delivery of the weapons and associated contraband.

As is customary the “handling and control” of CW’s corresponds closely to what it is like to navigate a minefield. CW’s are specifically recruited not only for their individual assets but for the “access” they have to criminals and the environment they operate within. Allen, a retired U.S. Navy Senior Chief and longtime resident of the Philippines, obviously had “access” to the criminal underworld. However, it was his intelligence and cunning that set him apart and placed him squarely into the status of an “invaluable asset.”

Those same attributes are also what designated Allan as particularly “dangerous” for his control Agent. Extreme caution had to be exercised for Allen certainly had the ability to place his designated control Agent in a classic “trick bag” or worse, a lethal altercation wherein the Agent or others ended up riding the “Death Train”.

I was sitting on a “high horse” after the successful completion of the illegal weapons operation targeting the Japanese Yakuza in Atsugi. Unfortunately, an abrupt dismount occurred when I was notified that my source “Mike Allen” had been identified as “stealing classified messages” and information from the Cubi Naval Station Communication Center where he was employed. A solid “horse kick” arrived shortly after when N.I.S. launched a full blown “Espionage” case against my CW Mike Allen. Getting back on the horse was now complicated by the issue of having to collect information and evidence against Allen for Espionage, while at the same time continuing to utilize him in his “source” capacity.

Confusion and mission clarity became the Devil. When working CW’s it is common for bonds between Source and Handler to occur. In this case Allen and I had developed a solid working relationship which had already paid off in huge dividends. The “Cebu Specials” delivered to the Japanese Yakuza in Atsugi had resulted in one of the most successful cases ever against the “Lords of Organized Crime”. Now to work against Allen, but at the same time continue to task and coordinate other operational efforts, was at times numbing. Solace came however, from an unexpected source.

Years before, as a young Agent with the Oklahoma Bureau, I had learned an age old lesson. That lesson would now navigate me through the inner conflicts which had ignited once Allen was identified as a “Espionage Suspect”. The lesson was simple; Outlaws can appear as good guys, however when the cards fall wrong, they will put you in the “grave to make a getaway”.

Ramping up with operational obligations involving Allen moved me into overdrive. Other investigative endeavors mandated my movement into warp drive. A series of “van hijackings’ ‘ resulting in all passengers being robbed landed squarely on my desk. Since the Vans being victimized were U.S. Navy Vehicles transporting U.S. Military and Civilian personnel between Subic Bay Naval Base and the International Airport in Manilla, jurisdiction fell jointly on N.I.S. and the Philippine Constabulary.

First order of business was to introduce another CW into the picture. Danny O , N.I.S. ‘s go to Constabulary representative was subsequently briefed and incorporated into the investigative effort. Due to the hijackings occurring at different points along the Subic to Manila route no specific area or town could be identified as the hijackers home base. As a result, operational plans consisting of setting up “Decoy Vans”, containing heavily armed Constabulary personnel as a reaction force were implemented. Once the hijackers forced the decoy Van to the side of the road the armed force within the Van would engage the perpetrators.

As is required a request for Operational approval was forwarded to N.I.S. Hq. Approval was granted, however specific caveats were attached. Instructions received barred the use of U.S. weapons by the “reaction force” and also mandated that the reaction team be composed solely of Constabulary or Philippine Military personnel. Hq. evidently anticipated, what we already knew, that if the decoy operation resulted in our “special van” being forced off the road, the occupants would not be announcing “you are under arrest — throw your weapons down” as they scrambled to confront the culprits.

Asking counterparts to undertake potentially dangerous operations is not normally an issue. However, asking them to “go in harm’s way” and following with “we can’t go with you” is difficult to explain in any language. Saying “Hq. says we can’t go” would be equivalent to a wet dog slamming your counterpart to the ground. Situational ethics tempered with a sure fire “professional risk” intercedes — “Hq. says I can’t join you”, followed by “I need a Constabulary hat — jacket” and “one of your M-16’s.”

As fate goes our first, second and third “decoy” nights did not produce any “Joy”. Other commitments restricted my participation on the fourth night. As a result the Van Crew was composed solely of Constabulary and Philippine Military personnel. As the target Van entered an area known as “Happy Valley” hijackers moved in. Once the Van stopped the “hidden crew” did “what they did best”. Resulting impact — U.S. Navy Vans traveling freely and safely between Subic and the Manilla Airport.

Tasking direction was received relating to Allen’s potential interaction with “hostile intelligence agents”. Specific concerns were directed towards his possible contact with “Russian Operatives”. The new tasking coupled with increased monitoring of Allen’s telephonic communications and in-country travel, dictated more in person interaction. A late night telephone interception between Allen and a Chinese National in Manilla raised “concern” to an unprecedented level.

Agents assigned monitoring duties notified the N.I.S. Regional Director immediately. Two (2) a.m and alarm bells resonated with all personnel that had been read into the details of Allen’s Espionage activities. Follow up call arrived in my room at the Subic Officer Quarters. Discussions between Allen and an unknown Chinese National entailed “he’s been shot before and he didn’t die” “he would have to be shot in the head”. Early morning scramble at the Subic N.I.S. Office resulted in the playing and listening of the intercept tapes of Allen’s conversation. It was clear to all listening that Allen was arranging a “heroin transaction” wherein he intended to introduce a U.S. Navy Chief as the “transporter”. Allen’s referral to “he has been shot before” and “shot in the head” was his unscripted way of securing the confidence of the person he was talking with. Allen, being an experienced and savvy undercover operative knew that a “bit of truth” can at times solidify confidence with your Target.

Allen, knowing I had previously sustained a gunshot wound, was in fact “doing his job” when he incorporated the incident into his undercover role. If challenged, Allen could resort to “let them see your bullet hole Chief” and a simple “show and tell” would put all involved in the “good to go” mode.

Obvious restrictions relating to confronting Allen barred direct questioning. His Espionage activities were continuing to be investigated and I had continued to task him to develop potential operations targeting Criminal Activity. Copy catting his previous activity, where he arranged for the shipment of firearms to Atsugi Japan, he called an “audible”. Unknown to Allen, the Audible was recorded. Coinciding with the “audible” was a request from Allen for me to travel to Manila with him. Concerns ramped up for Allen had become more braxant in his “outlaw” activities and dropped concerns about my knowledge of those activities.

An accurate determination as to “why” was critical. Only two explanations came forward. The first, Allen truly had become “comfortable” with me professionally and personally or secondly, Allen was “out of control” running a game directed at targeting me. Vigilance was already in the max mode and I found myself overloaded with “clues” as to “trust or no trust” in regards to my CW. Final assessment was “some trust” but not enough for me to “stake my life on it”.

Mental preparation mandated not only precautions but the understanding that “situational awareness” was key to my survival. Total control of all was impossible however, maintaining an accurate “threat assessment” at all times became the norm. My brain finally locked in “make the case if you can” but if a south turn occurs “do what is needed” to survive.

We arrived in Manila in the midafternoon. Allen and I had secured separate rooms and unknown to Allen I had secured a room where I could monitor if Allen had “visitors”. After eating dinner we were having “drinks” in my room. Allen appeared to be a bit more talkative and less inhibited than usual. Knowing that “changes in behavior even subtle ones” can quickly end in a red flag situation I was dialed in. Conversation moved to “most effective handguns” for carry. Allen, non chantilly follows by pulling a 1911, Colt 45 cal. pistol from under his shirt. I had suspected Allen occasionally “carried” but this was the first absolute confirmation.

Allen had placed the pistol on the table so while asking “you mind if I look” I reached slowly for the gun. Once secured I pulled the slide back and discovered that the magazine was full but a round was not “up the pipe”. Before placing the pistol down I removed the mag and dropped the hammer. It had not been a major surprise that Allen possessed a gun but it had been an “eye opener” that he was carrying it on his person. Showboating was my initial reaction. No round up the pipe indicated no “lethal intent”. Intent or not, I was sure Allen had not snapped on just how close he had been to getting his “showboat self” smoked.

My mind raced as I tried to maintain composure emitting no unwanted warning signs to Allen. A short time elapsed and a “knock” at Allen’s room door was heard. Allen excused himself and left my room immediately conversing with an unknown person in the hall. I quickly moved to secure my door and quietly engaged the dead bolt. Within a short time Allen tapped at my door “saying” he had someone he wanted me to meet. Feeling major league concern for this “unexpected visitor” I immediately told Allen “I will meet you guys in the lobby shortly”.

Breathing deeply and focusing efforts helped in slowing my physical and emotional state. As I exited my room I carefully walked past the elevator entrance to the end of the hall. As I descended the stairs I felt solid that if “a game was on” then Allen and his guest would expect me to exit the elevator in the lobby. Arriving by stairs would allow time to not only access the lobby area but to pinpoint both Allen and his quest prior to them seeing me. A bit of relief came once I realized that they both were sitting at a small table drinking coffee. As I approached the table I calmly said “sorry for the delay” and pulled a chair out to sit.

Allen immediately introduced me to his guest. “This is Chief Johnson,” Allen said as the man reached out to shake my hand. Chinese was my first guess although he spoke remarkably good English. I quickly assessed his age as mid forty. His build was athletic and his muscle density indicated excessive gym time. Short cropped black hair, dark eyes, and clean shaven pretty much summed up Allen’s new friend Mr. Wren.

Discussions were limited to small talk with one exception. Mr. Wren addressed Allen, saying “San Diego” and followed by “no problem”. Instead of answering Allen gave his friend a thumbs up accompanied by a grin which to me looked like a cat that had just eaten a pet Parakeet. Once Mr. Wren looked at me, I smiled slightly and nodded my concurrence. After Mr. Wren left I asked Allen “San Diego, what the hell? Allen then confided that is where Wren’s “people” want the “packages to go”.

Travel back to Subic from Manila went smoothly. Allen was without a doubt proud of what he had arranged with Mr. Wren. His enthusiasm and excitement was evident and even more apparent was his quest for recognition. Recognizing “his compliment fishing” I related that my Bosses and Hq.’s are “going to be blown away” while silently thinking “I’m blown away for sure”.

The following week saw a huge push to bring the Espionage case against Allen to fruition. I/Bloody Mary was the case designation and the operational pressure generated by N.I.S. Hq. was off the chart. When queried, I voiced my assessment of not only I/Bloody Mary but other investigative considerations. Emphasis was placed on finishing with Mr. Wren prior to “dropping the hammer” on Allen. Liaison conducted with Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) representatives in Manila resulted in efforts to introduce a D.E.A. Agent to Mr. Wren for the purpose of replacing “Chief Johnson” as the “transport person”.

DEA after action report detailing their successful link up with Mr. Wren and the subsequent delivery of “the package” to Mr. Wren’s associates in San Diego, set all involved on their backsides. “The package” turned out to be twenty (20) kilograms of pure Heroin with an estimated street value of twenty million dollars. Reverberations kicked through Chinese Criminal elements both in California and Manilla. Mr. Wren the “fix it man” headed to prison at the same time his friend Allen headed for U.S. Military prosecution for Espionage. Ironically Allen’s initial imprisonment and prosecution took place in San Diego, California.

SAN DIEGO, AUG. 15 — A retired Navy radioman was convicted at a court-martial Friday of passing confidential U.S. intelligence documents to a branch of the Philippine military and was sentenced to eight years in prison.

Michael Allen, of Ponchatoula, La., had faced possible life imprisonment, but a six-officer court-martial imposed the eight-year sentence Friday after returning the guilty verdict. Allen also was fined $10,000 and ordered to forfeit the remainder of his retirement pay, the Navy said.

In the summer of 1987, physical security concerns relating to Agent Smith resulted in his transfer from Subic Bay, Philippines to Agent Afloat duties aboard the AirCraft Carrier, U.S.S. Independence.